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Why do we care? The shifting concept of care in New Zealand and in the United Kingdom  
Roseanne Russell and Annick Masselot 
 
Abstract  
In recent years, there has been increased activity on the part of legislators and policy-makers 
as they attempt to reconcile paid work and unpaid care. This paper explores the different 
approaches adopted by two common law jurisdictions: New Zealand and the United Kingdom. 
These case studies attempt to take a more expansive approach to the concept of care by 
purportedly disentangling the act of caring from traditional conceptions of motherhood. In 
the UK, this has been done by permitting mothers to transfer entitlement to caring leave to 
fathers but is underpinned by implicit assumptions that the primary responsibility for care will 
remain with the mother. In New Zealand, there has been a departure from historic reliance 
on gender identities to take a more gender-neutral approach by providing caring leave to 
whoever is a primary carer for a child regardless of biological connection. One unintended 
consequence of this has been that biological mothers have been left with the barest health 
and safety protection post-birth. These case studies reveal how difficult it is for legislators and 
policy-makers to devise care-giving protections that are not in some way tainted by the legacy 
of traditional care/home/women and work/market/men dichotomies and demonstrate the 




In recent years and across jurisdictions, there has been considerable legal evolution in relation 
to the concept of care within the context of the family. While the biological process of 
childbearing is largely unchanged,1 and the needs of new-born children have remained 
constant, what has altered are societal expectations of who should provide care, and how 
these fit with shifting constructions of the family. Traditionally, there existed a strict 
dichotomy between work and family lives with, as Olsen has observed, men being associated 
with the former and women with the latter.2 This legacy of associating women with unpaid 
labour in the home meant that ‘the social construction of the male breadwinner’3 emerged 
as a model for determining wages and often devalued women’s earnings as ancillary income. 
While the social reality has moved considerably beyond the male breadwinner paradigm to 
an economic and welfare model premised on ‘the adult worker’, the historical treatment of 
women’s labour as being confined to the domestic sphere has meant that the very idea of 
what it means to be a worker has been moulded in highly gendered terms.4 For Pateman, 
 
1 We discuss the unique situation of surrogacy below and there have, of course, been significant developments 
over recent decades in assisted forms of reproduction. See, in particular, A. Masselot and R. Powell (eds.), 
Perspectives on Commercial Surrogacy in New Zealand: Ethics, Law, Policy and Rights, Centre for Commercial 
and Corporate Law, 2019. 
2 FE Olsen, ‘The Family and the Market: A study of Ideology and Legal Reform’ (1983) 96 (7) Harvard Law Review 
1497. 
3 J. O’Reilly, M. Smith, S. Deakin and B. Burchell, ‘Equal Pay as a Moving Target: International perspectives on 
forty years of addressing the gender pay gap’ (2015) 39 Cambridge Journal of Economics 299, 328. 
4 On the shift from a male breadwinner to adult worker model of the family see J. Lewis and S. Giullari, ‘The 





“…the construction of the ‘worker’ presupposes that he is a man who has a woman, a 
(house)wife, to take care of his daily needs. The private and public spheres of civil 
society are separate, reflecting the natural order of sexual difference, and inseparable, 
incapable of being understood in isolation from each other”.5 
 
Such an environment has encouraged men to perform as breadwinners unencumbered by 
caring responsibilities albeit that ‘the ideology of fatherhood has also evolved so as to include 
an element of nurturing’,6 while the paradigm of a good mother is bound up with notions of 
‘saintly self-denial’.7 These ideologies of what it means to be an ideal mother, ideal father and 
ideal worker have become strained as, in recent decades, women and men both increasingly 
participate in the paid labour market and in the unpaid labour of care. For James, the 
transition in family-economic models from ‘male breadwinner’ to ‘adult worker’ has in part 
been a response to wider structural changes in the labour market necessitating increased and 
more flexible labour8 but also reflects shifts in individual identities. The image of the self-
sacrificing and nurturing ‘ideal’ mother for example fails to resonate in the contemporary paid 
labour market in which women are active participants.9  
 
Despite the shift to an adult-worker family-economic model, structural change of our 
institutions and social policies have lagged behind. Strict gender divisions are arguably 
necessary for the survival of an out-dated economic model of ‘male breadwinner’, which 
affords a central place to paid work in the market. Reliance on these divisions is problematic 
as it not only entrenches troubling and restrictive ideologies of motherhood and parenting 
but also continues to separate life into distinctly private (care) and public (work) spheres. 
Policy-makers have attempted to grapple with the complexity of addressing the reconciliation 
of paid work and care but have been hindered by a failure to unravel these gendered 
ideologies. Strategies that have encouraged women’s participation in a paid labour market 
based on these gender divisions demand ‘only that women be allowed to participate in the 
current discriminatory system in which males have access to gender privilege that women 
lack’.10 Meanwhile, caring policies that have typically been modelled on providing special 
treatment for women, such as the right to paid maternity leave, have been accused of being 
grounded on a claim that ‘they can’t live up to societal standards designed without them in 
 
and problems of a capabilities approach’ (2005) 34 (1) Economy and Society 76; J. Lewis, ‘The adult worker 
model family, care and the problem of gender equality’ (2006) 14 (1) The Journal of Poverty and Social Justice 
33; C. Annesley, ‘Lisbon and social Europe: towards a European “adult worker model” welfare system’ (2007) 
17 (3) Journal of European Social Policy 195; and R. Guerrina, ‘Socio-economic challenges to work-life balance 
at times of crisis’ (2015) 37 (3) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 368. 
5 C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Polity Press; Bristol, 1988), 131. 
6 G. James, ‘Mothers and fathers are parents and workers: family-friendly employment policies in an era of 
shifting identities’ (2009) 31 (3) Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 271, 274. On the pressures on men see 
J. Williams, ‘Jumpstarting the Stalled Gender Revolution: Justice Ginsburg and Reconstructive Feminism’ (2012) 
63 Hastings Law Journal 1267. 
7 J. Williams, Reshaping the Work-Family Debate: Why Men and Class Matter (Harvard University Press; 
Cambridge, Mass., 2010), 150. 
8 James (2009), 271. On the consequences for women of the shift to increased precariousness in the labour 
market see J. Fudge and R. Owens (eds) Precarious work, women, and the new economy: the challenges to 
legal norms (Hart Publishing; Oxford, 2006). 
9 James (2009), 272-4. 
10 J. Williams, ‘Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist 




mind’.11 Neither strategy tackles the structural problem of the continued gender segregation 
of work and family life.  
 
In this paper, we argue that the reconciliation of paid work and unpaid care requires a 
regulatory framework that is built upon the premise of universal caring responsibilities and 
that moves beyond the current preoccupation of equating care with womanhood. We 
examine recent developments in caring leave in two common law jurisdictions, Aotearoa/New 
Zealand (NZ) and the United Kingdom (UK). Both countries have sought to extend paid caring 
leave on the arrival of a child into a family to those who are not biological mothers. The 
particular cultural contexts of these two jurisdictions have led to different models being 
adopted. In NZ, leave is now given to the ‘primary caregiver’ regardless of biological 
association. In the UK, ‘shared parental leave’ allows a child’s parents to decide how to share 
care over the first year. In both cases, the legislators appear to have adopted a far more 
expansive notion of caregiving than was previously the case with caring leave no longer being 
the sole preserve of the biological mother. Despite the apparent progress that these 
enhanced entitlements suggest, these new rights are informed both explicitly and implicitly 
by gendered notions of ideal parenthood and confusion over the precise purpose of caring 
leave. In both cases, statutory leave may be transferred to others, but this is conditional on 
the biological mother giving up her primary entitlement to maternity leave, thereby endorsing 
the close association between care and ideal motherhood. In the UK, mothers who do transfer 
their entitlement to care leave and, in NZ, women who give birth but do not go on caring for 
their offspring, risk being left with the barest healthy and safety protections. In the UK, 
enhanced payments for care are denied to those other than the biological mother. The result 
is a somewhat messy patchwork of well-intentioned policy goals that lack any theoretical 
coherence around what care leave is for. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. In Part 1, we set out the right to care leave in NZ following 
the adoption of the Parental Leave and Employment Protection Amendment Act in 2017. Part 
2 outlines the right to caring leave in the UK with a focus on the Shared Parental Leave 
Regulations 2014. Turning to Part 3, we advance the central argument of this paper, which is 
that there persists a fundamental lack of clarity on the part of legislators and courts about the 
purpose of leave connected to the arrival of a child into the family. Part 4 outlines the dire 
consequences linked to the lack of clarity underpinning care leave. From a feminist 
perspective, the lack of clarity with regards to the aims of maternity and other forms of leave 
results not only in the prejudicial treatment of the relevant workers, but also affects the 
employability of all women regardless of whether they become a mother or not. In Part 5, we 
argue that a more expansive concept of care leave has the potential to unsettle the 
problematic notions of ideal parenthood and ideal worker at play in this area, but that this 
requires a more deep-seated structural reform, not just of the structure of care leave but with 
the organisation of the paid labour market. We suggest that giving a more central place to 
‘caring’ and questioning the law’s assumption of autonomous legal subjects provides a helpful 
starting point for future work. A brief conclusion proposes a radical shift in untangling the 








Part 1: The New Zealand law on the right to leave following the birth of a child  
 
The Parental Leave and Employment Protection Amendment Act, adopted on 4 December 
2017, follows a pledge to improve parental leave legislation by the newly elected Labour-led 
coalition government. It amends the NZ Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987 
(“PLEPA”) to provide qualifying employees who care for a child with the right to primary carer 
leave from work and parental leave payment, from about the time of the birth, adoption 
order, or the start of the caring period.  
 
Prior to the 2017 amendments, the leave, then referred to as ‘parental leave’, was exclusively 
granted in two situations: either the female worker had given birth to a child, for whom she 
and her partner were caring or following the formal adoption of a child under the age of five.12  
The statute did not consider any other situations such as circumstances in which a woman 
would give birth to a child but would not go on caring for him or her. There were at least two 
situations of family formations relevant to the NZ context that were ignored and which 
resulted in the prejudicial treatment of the relevant workers.  These two situations are those 
of surrogacy13 and whāngai arrangements under Māori customary values and practices. In 
both cases, the child is cared for by someone who is not his/her biological parent.14 Māori 
customary values and practices, or Tikanga Māori, have developed over time and are legally 
recognised in NZ legislation. Whāngai arrangements under the indigenous Māori custom are 
comparable to formal adoption under the Adoption Act 1995.15 However, traditional Māori 
understandings of the concept of family are much broader than that of many Europeans, 
which is often restricted to parents and children; the so-called nuclear family.16 The 
conceptualisation of the family in European legal tradition is moreover characterised by legal 
rights based on a notion of formal attachment between child and parents and an idea of 
‘possession’.17 In contrast, Māori children are part of an extended family group or whānau, 
through whakapapa (genealogy). Whānau comprise the bottom tier of a social hierarchy that 
embraces both the idea of a living entity and extended family that can extend back three 
generations and to which members are bound. The social hierarchy is comprised of whānau, 
hapū and iwi. Hapū is the middle tier and consists of a number of whānau; a modern definition 
often used for hapū is ‘sub-tribe’. Iwi describes the top tier of this hierarchy and consists of 
 
12 PLEPA, s 71A (as before 1 July 2018). 
13 In surrogacy cases, a woman (the surrogate) gives birth to a child but does not go on to care for that child, 
who is then looked after by the intended parent(s) (D. Wilson ‘Surrogacy in New Zealand’ (2016) New Zealand 
Law Journal 401). The intended parent(s) are individuals, who intend to become the legal parents (mothers 
and/or fathers) of a child produced as a result of a surrogacy agreement, adoption, foster or other agreements. 
Under NZ law, the woman who gives birth to a child is the legal parent of that child (and her partner is the other 
legal parent), until the intended parents have formally adopted the child. Status of Children Act 1969, s 17. See 
A. Masselot and R. Powell (eds.), Perspectives on Commercial Surrogacy in New Zealand: Ethics, Law, Policy and 
Rights (Centre for Commercial and Corporate Law 2019). 
14 See generally A. Masselot and I. Schelp, ‘Parental Leave and Surrogacy: Caring is Everything’, in A. Masselot 
and R. Powell (eds.), Perspectives on Commercial Surrogacy in New Zealand: Ethics, Law, Policy and Rights 
(Centre for Commercial and Corporate Law 2019) 137-153. 
15 J. Ruru, ‘Kua Tutū Te Puehu, Kia Mau: Māori Aspirations and Family Law Policy’ in M. Henaghan and B. Atkin 
(eds) Family Law Policy in New Zealand (4th ed LexisNexis, Wellington, 2013). 
16 J. Trost, ‘Do we mean the same by the concept of family’ (1990) 17 (4) Communication Research 431. 
17 K. Fiona, ‘Conceptualising the child through an ‘ethic of care’: lessons for family law’ (2005) 1 (4) 
International Journal of Law in Context 375; L. Hantrais and M.T. Letabiler, Families and family policies in 




multiple related hapū. Iwi is associated with a regional territory and is often used 
interchangeably with the word ‘tribe’.18 The entire Whānau, which are typically multi-layered, 
flexible and dynamic as well as being based on a Māori and a tribal worldview, are committed 
and involved at different stages in the growth and development of children.19  Whānau is the 
key unit for raising a child, in addition to the parents. Therefore, the rights associated with 
raising children are not exclusive to the parents. Whānau relationships include those with 
whāngai (foster/adopted children) and those who have passed on.20  
 
Family, in the Māori context, is therefore a far wider conception than that envisaged in the 
UK context discussed below. Prior to the 2017 amendment of the PLEPA however, intended 
parents did not have a right to parental leave until they had formally adopted the child,21 
which process would typically take a year. Under Māori customs, it is normal for someone 
besides the biological parents of the child to play a significant role in that child’s life. Although 
the concept of whāngai parents in traditional Māori customs has been interpreted broadly by 
the NZ courts, they have struggled to find a way to deal with diverse concepts of family. It had 
long been argued that parental leave should be granted to those who cared for young children 
regardless of their biological ties to the child and indeed, the PLEPA has, at times but not 
consistently, been interpreted in a way that extends paid parental leave to parents in cases 
of whāngai and customary adoptions.22 
 
Against this backdrop, the 2017 statutory amendment to the PLEPA introduces the concept 
of primary care giver leave, which focusses on the requirement of care rather than on 
gestation.23 The primary carer leave replaces the former right to parental leave. The definition 
of a primary carer is set out in Section 7(1) of the PLEPA. A primary carer is either a female 
(the biological mother) who is pregnant or has given birth to a child; or the spouse or partner 
of the biological mother, if she dies24 or if she transferred all or part of her entitlement to 
parental leave payment to that spouse or partner25 and if the spouse or partner becomes the 
person who takes primary care of the child and meets the parental leave payment thresholds 
test; or a person, other than the biological mother or her spouse or partner, who takes 
permanent primary responsibility for the care, development, and upbringing of a child who is 
under the age of 6 years. Arguably, the primary carer leave represents a wide understanding 
of the concept of family as it embraces a broad spectrum of family constellations. Section 
7(1)(c) includes formal adoption, whāngai arrangements under Māori custom,26 Home for Life 
 
18 R. Benton, A. Frame and P. Meredith Te Mātāpunenga: A Compendium of References to the Concepts and 
Institutions of Māori Customary Law (Victoria University Press: Wellington, 2013) at 521, 100; A. Cooke, ‘The 
Children, Young Persons, and Their Family Act and Māori Children’ (2015) 8 NZFLJ 121, 121. 
19 K. McRae and L. Waimarie Nikora ‘Whāngai: Remembering, Understanding and Experiencing’ (2006) 1 MAI 
Review 1, 3. 
20 A. Mikaere ‘Māori Women: Caught in the Contradictions of a Colonised Reality’ (1994) 2 Waikato Law 
Review 125. 
21 Bell v Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment [2013] NZERA Wellington 68 5402282. 
22 Toroa v Department of Labour 2007 WA 148/07 5087663 at [14]. 
23 The Parental Leave and Employment Protection Amendment Act 2016, s 16 replaced s 7 with the meaning of 
primary carer. 
24 Section 72B PLEPA.  
25 Section 71E PLEPA. 
26 In contrast to the European nuclear concept of family, which strongly relies on the formal attachment between 





carers27 and grandparents caring for their grandchildren but excludes foster parents and child 
minders. 
 
There can only be one person entitled to primary carer leave. Section 7 of the PLEPA states, 
that in the case of two or more persons meeting the criteria for parental leave, those persons 
must jointly nominate which one of them is to be the primary carer and only the nominated 
person is entitled to primary carer leave and parental leave payments under the Act.28 
Intended parents, in cases of surrogacy, are therefore able to secure their right to a period of 
leave from the time they care for the infant, which usually starts immediately at birth. 
 
Under the amended legislation, the primary carer of a child under the age of 6 years old is 
entitled to a continuous period of up to 22 weeks of primary carer leave.29 To qualify for 
primary carer leave, an employee must have worked for the same employer for at least an 
average of 10 hours a week over the immediately preceding 6 or 12 months.30 In addition, 
primary carers are entitled to unpaid extended leave31 – either 26 or 52 weeks, depending on 
whether s/he meets the 6-month continuous employment test (which qualifies to 26 weeks 
of unpaid extended leave), or the 12-month test, qualifying for 52 weeks. Following the period 
of leave, the employee is entitled to return to work under the same conditions as prior to 
taking the leave. 
 
During the 22 weeks of primary carer leave the person, who meets the parental leave 
payment threshold test, is also entitled to receive parental leave payments.32 Self-employed 
persons who are the primary carer of a child under the age of 6 and who met the parental 
leave payment thresholds test are also eligible to up to 22 weeks parental leave payments.33 
It should be noted that parental leave payment is managed by the government and is set at a 
level under that of the minimum wage,34 prompting criticisms that productive activities are 
more valued than reproductive ones.35 
 
 
to an extended family group or whānau, through whakapapa (genealogy). The entire whānau are committed 
and involved at different stages in the growth and development of the child (A. Mikaere ‘Māori Women: Caught 
in the Contradictions of a Colonised Reality’ (1994) 2 Waikato Law Review 125 at 129-130. The Māori term for 
whānau also means ‘to be born’ and ‘give birth’ (J. Moorfield Te Aka Māori-English, English-Māori Dictionary 
(Pearson, Auckland, 2011)). 
27 Permanent care, or Home for Life as it is known, involves a legal process to enable a person to be a child’s 
permanent caregiver. This happens when a decision is made by the Family Court that a child cannot be cared for 
by their own family and a permanent caregiver is designated for life. See A. Jackson and A. Gibbs, ‘New Zealand’s 
Home for Life Policy: Telling Children they Matter but only for Three Years’ (2016) 30 IJLPF 322. 
28 PLEPA, s 7(2). 
29 PLEPA, ss 7-16. The primary carer leave will increase to 26 weeks from 1 July 2020.  
30 PLEPA, s8(1). See Rudman supra, 265. 
31 PLEPA, s 23. 
32 PLEPA, S71A. An employee meets the test if they will have been employed as an employee for at least an 
average of 10 hours a week for any 26 of the 52 weeks just before the due date of the baby or the date they or 
their partner becomes the primary carer of the child under 6 permanently. The employment for this test can be 
with more than one employer and does not have to be continuous employment.  
33 PLEPA, s 71CB. 
34 In 2019, the employee’s weekly parental leave payment was set at the maximum amount of $585.80 gross per 
week compared to $708 for the minimum wage.  
35 A. Masselot, ‘Gender Implications of the Right to Request Flexible Working Arrangements: Raising Pigs and 




Primary carer leave and extended leave can be shared with the partner of the primary carer36 
if the partner has a 6-month or 12-month continuous period of employment and is intending 
to assume the responsibility for the care of the child.37 If the partner meets the parental leave 
payment threshold test, then s/he is also entitled to receive parental leave payments.38 
Extended leave and partner leave are available only if the primary carer initially meets the 
eligibility criteria.  
 
The partner of the primary carer is moreover entitled to a continuous period of partner’s 
leave39 of 1 week partner’s leave where the employee meets the 6-month employment test 
or 2 weeks when meeting the 12-month employment test.40 
 
Finally, Section 15 of the PLEPA regulates special leave for pregnant employees. Pregnant 
female employees are entitled to take a total of up to 10 days of special leave without pay for 
reasons connected to the pregnancy.41 This section is a special form of maternity leave 
applicable to pregnant employees only.42 The special leave is exclusively applicable to the 
gestational connection between mother and child,43 and would therefore apply to a pregnant 
surrogate.  
 
The NZ legislator’s construction of the family for the purposes of care leave has sought to 
neutralise gender as an organising concept. Going significantly beyond traditional 
heteronormative ideas of the family, primary care giver leave recognises the diversity of 
family units and focuses on the emotional labour of care rather than value-laded assumptions 
about the gender of the care-provider. In contrast to the UK developments we discuss in Part 
2, the NZ model provides an example of how it is possible to develop protections for care-
givers based on a more realistic and less gendered image of the family. Yet, by moving to a 
more gender-neutral conception of care, the risk is that biological mothers become 
disadvantaged. Section 15 of the PLEPA is the only provision which is based on health-related 
considerations for the pregnant worker. In the majority of cases, the mother who gave birth 
is also the woman who cares for her infant. Therefore, the same person will need both 
recovery and time to care for her infant. However, as the right to leave has been made gender 
neutral and focussed exclusively on care, it no longer provides this health and safety function. 
As the leave is granted on the ground of care, the woman who gives birth receives no 
protection in cases such a surrogacy and whāngai. The new NZ legislation has therefore 
increased the vulnerability of those women who give birth but do not go on caring for the 
child. These women are only entitled to 10 days’ special leave (unpaid) for reasons connected 
to the pregnancy.44 Whether 10 days’ special leave for a gestational mother is sufficient is an 
important (medical) issue especially for women, who act as surrogate mothers or for mothers 
who lose their child during birth. The question is compounded by the fact that the 10 days 
special leave is to cover needs both during pregnancy and post-birth. The usual postpartum 
 
36 PLEPA, ss 28 and 29. 
37 PLEPA, s 17. 
38 PLEPA, 171D. 
39 PLEPA, s 17. 
40 PLEPA, s 19. 
41 P. Kiely, New Zealand Guide to Holidays and Leave (4th ed, CCH Wolters Kluwer, Auckland, 2016), 121-150. 
42 PLEPA, s 15. 
43 Not yet providing for the rare case of gestational fathers as it is only limited to female employees. 




recovery period after giving birth is recognised to be around six weeks.45 Although the 
intention is to minimise costs of maternity cases, it seems unjustified to overlook the medical 
needs for recovery of birthing mothers when they are not eligible to primary carer leave. 
When the gestational and intended mother are not the same, as in surrogacy cases, there is 
a risk that the needs of the gestational mother may not be met. Moreover, as the 10 days 
special leave are unpaid, low paid women will likely be tempted to compromise their health 
and safety to minimise the number of unpaid days. The fact that the leave is unpaid further 
shows that women’s unique and essential reproductive ability remains entrenched in the 
private sphere and invisible to the market.   
 
Part 2: Shared Parental Leave in the UK 
The UK offers a helpful comparison with the NZ context. While both common law jurisdictions 
have recently grappled with the dilemma of how to resolve the care-work conundrum, each 
has taken a different approach. As discussed above, the NZ model is premised on care. It goes 
considerably beyond traditional heteronormative concepts of the family and separates the 
act of childbirth from the subsequent act of caring. One criticism that may be made of it, 
however, is that the health and safety concerns of the biological mother are given insufficient 
attention under this new gender-neutral model. In contrast, the UK has tried to unsettle the 
gender division of work and care labour but continues to rely too heavily on these gender 
distinctions. Welden-Johns has described three clear stages in the development of ‘work-
family rights’ in the UK: rights for mothers, gender-neutral rights for carers and, the current 
stage, ‘expanding these rights to working fathers, specifically recognizing their role and 
enabling them to address their work-family commitments’.46 Although the entitlement to 
paid caring leave has changed dramatically in recent years due to the introduction of Shared 
Parental Leave (“SPL”) for children born on or after 2 April 2015,47 this entitlement is 
predicated on eligible mothers opting to bring their entitlement to statutory maternity leave 
to an end in order to allow the father to take leave.48 As the UK Government’s technical 
guidance on SPL makes clear, mothers may ‘choose’ to curtail their maternity leave. But, as 
Mitchell argues, this merely ‘continues to prioritise the caring role of mothers even though 
the long period of transferable leave symbolically recognises the caring role of other 
parents’,49 a development that James has described as ‘unfortunate’.50  
 
45 Maternity care under the NZ health system provides for up to six weeks of health visits by midwives, see 
Ministry of Health “Maternity care” <https://www.health.govt.nz/your-health/pregnancy-and-kids/services-
and-support-during-pregnancy/maternity-care>; The World Health Organisation and the ILO convention 183 
recommend a minimum of 14 weeks. A normal postpartum period, which is the time after birth during which 
the mother’s body returns to a non-pregnant state, is believed to take six to eight weeks. See P. Simkin et al., 
Pregnancy, Childbirth and the Newborn: The Complete Guide (Meadowbrook, 1984), 199-202. However, it has 
been pointed out that, for some women, adaptation to motherhood and recovery from childbirth may take 
longer. See, for example, S. Macdonald and J. Magill-Cuerden, May’s Midwifery (Bailliere Tindall, 2011), 725. 
46 M. Weldon-Johns, ‘The Additional Paternity Leave Regulations 2010: a new dawn or more ‘sound-bite’ 
legislation?’ (2011) 33 (1) Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 25, 25. 
47 Regulation 2(1) of The Shared Parental Leave Regulations 2014 SI 2014/3050 (“SPL Regulations”). 
48 Father may include the child’s father or the husband, partner or civil partner of the mother at the time of the 
child’s birth: Regulation 3(1) SPL Regulations.  
49 G. Mitchell, ‘Encouraging Fathers to Care: The Children and Families Act 2014’ (2015) 44 (1) Industrial Law 
Journal 123, 124. 
50 G. James, ‘Mothers and fathers as parents and workers: family-friendly employment policies in an era of 





The rights to statutory ordinary and additional maternity leave are set out in section 71 and 
73 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA) respectively. Maternity leave is for 52 weeks 
divided into 26 weeks’ ordinary maternity leave,51 followed by 26 weeks’ additional maternity 
leave.52 This is irrespective of how long the employee has worked for her employer, a change 
introduced by virtue of the Work and Families Act 2006. It is compulsory for two weeks of 
maternity leave to be taken.53  
UK domestic law in the area of maternity rights has been heavily informed by the European 
Union (EU) Pregnant Workers’ Directive.54  One important requirement of the Directive is that 
an ‘adequate allowance’ is paid to women during maternity leave so that women are able to 
enjoy the health and safety protection that the Directive aims to ensure.55 This allowance 
should guarantee ‘income at least equivalent to that which the worker concerned would 
receive in the event of a break in her activities on grounds connected with her state of health, 
subject to any ceiling laid down under national legislation’.56 In Gillespie and others v Northern 
Health and Social Services Boards,57 the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) ruled on the question 
of whether a woman on maternity leave was entitled to receive the full pay she would have 
received had she not been on leave. While the CJEU held that there was no requirement for 
a woman to continue to receive full pay in these circumstances,  
‘the amount payable could not, however, be so low as to undermine the purpose of 
maternity leave, namely the protection of women before and after giving birth. In 
order to assess the adequacy of the amount payable from that point of view, the 
national court must take account, not only of the length of maternity leave, but also 
of the other forms of social protection afforded by national law in the case of justified 
absence from work.’58 
In the UK, the regulation of statutory maternity pay is governed by the Social Security 
Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 and the Statutory Maternity Pay (General) Regulations 
1986.59 There are several conditions upon which statutory maternity pay is dependent. These 
include both an employment and earnings test. In respect of the former, the woman must 
have been employed by her employer ‘for a continuous period of at least 26 weeks ending 
with the week immediately preceding the 14th week before the expected week of 
confinement’.60 in respect of the latter, that she earned more than a prescribed amount in 
the 8-week period ending with the week immediately preceding the 14th week before the 
expected week of confinement.61 This amounts to earning on average at least £118 per week 
 
51 Regulation 7(1) of the Maternity and Parental Leave etc. Regulations 1999 SI 1999/3312 (“MPL Regulations”). 
52 Regulation 7(4) MPL Regulations.  
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54 Directive 92/85/EEC. 
55 Article 11(1) of Directive 92/85/EEC states that ‘the employment rights relating to the employment contract, 
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56 Article 11 (3) of Directive 92/85/EEC. 
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59 SI 1986/1960. 
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at the current rate. If eligible for statutory maternity pay, it is payable for 39 weeks. The first 
6 weeks is paid at 90% of normal weekly earnings.62 The remainder is paid at a Government-
prescribed weekly rate (currently) £148.68 or 90% of weekly earnings, whichever is lower. For 
James, the lack of earnings-related pay for the duration of maternity leave is problematic. She 
asserts that few women are ‘able to take advantage of long term maternity leave entitlement 
when pay is so low…This is especially true at a time when dual earner households are the 
norm…’.63 Writing in 2006 she also lamented the failure to provide ‘equivalent rights for 
fathers [which] perpetuates the ideology of motherhood’.64 Although the introduction of 
paternity leave and pay has to an extent addressed this concern, as will be argued below, the 
system of paid care leave in the UK remains steeped in the ideology of mothers being 
privileged as primary carers. 
Paternity leave 
In an attempt to disrupt the gendered patterns of caring and allow partners to participate in 
childcare, paternity leave was introduced by the New Labour Government but there were 
significant issues raised about the paucity of the right as it was originally enacted.65 The right 
to paid paternity leave (paid at the same Government-set rate for statutory maternity pay) 
was initially limited to two weeks’ leave, which must be taken within 56 days of the child’s 
birth. Moreover, as Caracciolo di Torella observed, ‘…the legislation rather obscurely states 
that fathers can use the leave ‘to care for the child and to ‘support the mother’, implying that 
the father is to play a secondary supporting role rather than being the primary carer.66  
A new, somewhat short-lived, right to additional paternity leave was introduced by the 
Additional Paternity Leave Regulations 2010.67 These allowed fathers to take up to six months' 
additional paternity leave if the mother returned to work but were abolished by the Children 
and Families Act 2014 and replaced with the current entitlement to shared parental leave.68 
What the Additional Paternity Leave Regulations gave fathers was ‘the opportunity of leave’ 
but the ‘real choice’ rested, argued Weldon-Johns, with mothers.69  It was working mothers 
who remained gate-keepers to a family’s caring arrangements. 
Shared Parental Leave 
Shared parental leave was introduced as a way of providing more flexibility to parents to 
arrange care to suit their personal circumstances. Apart from the compulsory two-week 
period of maternity leave that a mother must take to recover from the birth of the child, the 
remaining entitlement of 50 weeks’ leave and 37 weeks’ statutory pay can be split between 
parents.  
 
62 Section 166(1) SSCBA 1992. 
63 G. James, ‘The Work and Families Act 2006: Legislation to improve Choice and Flexibility?’ (2006) 35 (3) 
Industrial Law Journal 272, 273. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Employment Act 2002; The Paternity and Adoption Leave Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/2788). 
66 E. Caracciolo di Torella, ‘New Labour, New Dads – The Impact of Family Friendly Legislation on Fathers’ (2007) 
36 (3) Industrial Law Journal 318, 322. 
67 SI 2010/1055. 
68 Section 125 of the 2014 Act.  




The entitlement is governed by the Shared Parental Leave Regulations 2014. The SPL 
Regulations also apply to adoptive parents.70 ‘Father’ will be used as short-hand but this 
includes the child’s father or the mother’s husband, partner or civil partner at the time of 
birth.71 A number of conditions are specified in the SPL Regulations to be able to access the 
benefit. These include the requirements that the employee has been continuously employed 
for a period of not less than 26 weeks ending with the week immediately preceding the 14th 
week before the expected week of birth,72 and ‘remains in continuous employment with that 
employer until the week before any period of shared parental leave taken by the employee’.73 
She also has to have the main responsibility (apart from the father) for the child’s care at the 
date of birth74 and is entitled to statutory maternity leave in respect of the child.75  
For the father to claim SPL, he must also show that he has the main responsibility for the 
child’s care (apart from the mother)76 and must satisfy the employment and earnings test set 
out in Regulation 36. In summary, this requires that he will have been employed or self-
employed for at least 26 of the 66 weeks immediately preceding the expected week of birth 
and has average weekly earnings of not less than the current prescribed amount (around £30 
per week).77 For the leave to be transferred to the father, the mother has to be entitled to 
statutory maternity leave, pay or allowance and must have ended/curtailed her right to this.78 
Provided that the qualifying conditions are met, the parents are entitled to share the balance 
of statutory maternity leave between them.79 
Part 3: Why it matters why we care 
 
The recent experiences of NZ and the UK show that legislators are increasingly alive to the 
shifting composition of family life and its associated impact on who provides care for a new-
born child. In both jurisdictions, caregiving has the potential to become disassociated from 
the biological mother in a way that offers the opportunity for partners, or wider family 
members in the NZ experience, to assume responsibility for the care of a child. In attempting 
to develop policies that shape a better and fairer access to care, there is a risk that the NZ 
legislator has moved too far in favour of gender neutralisation and left insufficient protection 
in place for women who have given birth.80 In part, this result may be explained by the 
continuing debates around what caring leave is for, which we discuss in this Part. Put simply, 
the UK framework with its (over)reliance on gender categories upholds a conception of 
parenting leave predicated on mixed ideas of childcare and recovering from the effects of 
childbirth. The NZ model, in its attempt to adopt a wider conception of family and thereby 
escape traditional gender binary models of mother (carer) and father (breadwinner), has yet 
 
70 Regulation 2(2) SPL Regulations. 
71 Regulation 3(1) SPL Regulations. 
72 Regulation 35(1)(a) and Regulation 3(a) SPL Regulations.  
73 Regulation 35(1)(b) SPL Regulations. 
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77 Regulation 36(1)(a) and (5) SPL Regulations. 
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80 It should be noted that although recently a few men have given birth, each of them had biologically formerly 
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to find a way to reconcile the protection of a biological mother’s health with the policy 
imperative of protecting carers. It may offer a more expansive approach to caring but 
ironically it has not fully moved on from the legacy of associating mothers with care. In 
attempting to delineate care and gender, a lacuna has developed in the law’s protection 
where biological mothers lose out. 
Closer scrutiny of these caregiving entitlements also reveals a theoretical incoherence about 
the precise aims of care leave. In both cases, the initial entitlement rests with the biological 
mother, which simultaneously reinforces the problematic stereotype of the ideal mother who 
takes primary responsibility for childcare, while providing much-needed protection to women 
in a context of widespread pregnancy and maternal discrimination.81 By extending the care 
to others, however, both legislators and the courts who have had to grapple with these new 
rights have demonstrated confusion over what the aims of this care should be. On one view, 
it might be said that it does not matter why we care; what matters is that there is support for 
those who care and freedom for families to choose how best to structure their own care-
giving. On another view, why we care is of fundamental importance because it speaks to the 
value that we attach to care as a society and, importantly for our purposes, informs the most 
appropriate strategy for ensuring that those who do care are appropriately and sufficiently 
protected. In this Part, we analyse how the courts have framed the justification of maternity 
and other forms of leave, before turning, in Part 4, to how we might move beyond an over-
reliance of gendered categorisation in this area to afford a more central place to universal 
caring in future policy developments. 
 
Aims of maternity leave and parental leave 
 
Traditionally, employment law protection concerning pregnancy and maternity has at least 
three aims. The first is to allow the mother to recover physiologically following the birth 
through the provision of minimum standards of health and safety for the mother and the 
child. The health and safety goal of pregnancy/maternity leave is reflected in a number of 
international82 and regional83 provisions. This is captured by the current NZ and UK 
entitlements to a period of compulsory maternity leave that cannot be transferred.84  
 
The second aim is to provide some emotional space so that new parents are able to bond with 
the baby and meet its needs.85 While the leading decision of the CJEU in Hofmann v Barmer 
Ersatzkasse had originally restricted the protection to that of mother/infant,86 in recent times, 
 
81 HM Government and EHRC, Pregnancy and Maternity-related Discrimination and Disadvantage (London, 
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84 See section 15 PLEPA 2017 in respect of NZ and section 72(1) ERA and Regulation 8 of the MPL Regulations in 
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85 G. Douglas and N. Lowe ‘Becoming a Parent in English Law’ in J. Eekelaar and P. Sarcevic (eds) Parenthood in 
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the CJEU has expanded the protection to include the relationship between the infant and the 
father.87  
 
The third, and perhaps most controversial aim, is to ensure gender equality although precisely 
what is meant by this or how to achieve it remains contested. Gender equality in the 
workplace is cited as a major aim of the International Labour Organization’s Maternity 
Protection Convention (n. 183) (adopted in 1919 and last revised in 2000). In contrast, the EU 
has struggled to make the connection between pregnancy/maternity leave and gender 
equality.88 While in the Hofmann case the CJEU held that the equal treatment ‘directive is not 
designed to settle questions concerned with the organization of the family, or to alter the 
division of responsibility between parents',89 in Hill and Stapleton, the Court explicitly stated 
that ‘Community policy in this area is to encourage and, if possible, adapt working conditions 
to family responsibilities.’90 Over the past couple of decades, EU law has evolved to recognise 
that the achievement of gender equality in the workplace can only be realised if gender 
equality is also pursued in the private sphere. Accordingly, an increasing number of laws and 
policies are being designed to reconcile work and family life for all.91 These policies are largely 
predicated on women joining in the paid labour market on equal terms to men or in being 
permitted sufficient flexibility in their working lives to allow them to balance caring 
commitments. Neither formulation of gender equality appears to tackle the structural 
barriers that make it difficult to combine work and family life. While the introduction of care-
giving leave to family members other than the mother has the potential to disrupt these 
rather narrow notions of what gender equality means (by encouraging men to contribute to 
unpaid care and domestic work), the courts appear reluctant to embrace more substantive 
notions of gender equality that would require structural reform to our institutions. The recent 
UK Court of Appeal judgment in the conjoined cases of Ali v Capita Management Limited and 
Hextall v The Chief Constable of Leicestershire Police prove instructive in this regard.92 In these 
cases, the Court had to grapple with the question of whether it was unlawful sex 
discrimination to pay a man on shared parental leave less than what a woman would be paid 
on maternity leave. Like many employers, the respondents in these cases offer enhanced 
maternity pay beyond the statutory minimum. In Ali, the employer’s policy provided that 
enhanced maternity pay would be paid for 39 weeks comprising 14 weeks on full pay and 25 
weeks on statutory maternity pay (“SMP”) but fathers taking shared parental leave would 
only be entitled to statutory pay. Ali, whose wife had been advised to return to work after 
two weeks’ compulsory maternity leave, argued that it was direct discrimination contrary to 
section 13 of the Equality Act 2010 not to pay him enhanced maternity pay for 12 weeks. This 
was based on 14 weeks of enhanced maternity pay less the two weeks’ compulsory maternity 
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leave. The appropriate comparator was, he argued, a woman on maternity leave. He claimed 
that there was no material difference in circumstances relating to his case and that of a 
woman on maternity leave.93 At first instance, the Employment Tribunal agreed with him but, 
on appeal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) did not.  According to the EAT, relying on 
Hofmann, there was a fundamental difference in purpose between maternity leave and 
shared parental leave meaning that a woman on maternity leave was not an appropriate 
comparator. Regard was also had to the CJEU judgment in Commission v Luxembourg, where 
the Court contrasted maternity leave with parental leave: 94 
‘Parental leave is granted to parents to enable them to take care of their 
child…Maternity leave has a different purpose. It is intended to protect a woman's 
biological condition and the special relationship between a woman and her child over 
the period which follows pregnancy and childbirth, by preventing that relationship 
from being disturbed by the multiple burdens which would result from the 
simultaneous pursuit of employment…’ 
Relying on this earlier jurisprudence, the UK Court of Appeal reiterated that the ‘predominant 
purpose’ of maternity leave as set out in the Pregnant Workers’ Directive and Hofmann ‘is not 
childcare but other matters exclusive to the birth mother resulting from pregnancy and 
childbirth and not shared by the husband or partner’.95 The proper comparator for Ali was 
therefore a female employee on shared parental leave who would also have received the 
lower statutory rate of pay. As such, there was no direct discrimination. 
In Hextall, the argument was framed as one of indirect rather than direct sex discrimination. 
There, Hextall’s employer paid enhanced occupational maternity pay at 18 weeks’ full pay 
with the remainder at SMP rates. Only statutory pay was available during shared parental 
leave. Hextall took 14 weeks’ shared parental leave and was paid at the statutory rate. He 
claimed that his employer’s practice of ‘paying only the statutory rate of pay for those taking 
a period of shared parental leave’ put men at a particular disadvantage and was indirectly 
discriminatory contrary to section 19 of the Equality Act 2010. His employer argued that the 
claim should be properly characterised as falling under section 66 of the Act, an ‘equal pay’ 
provision that provides for a ‘sex equality clause’ to be imposed into a contract of 
employment so that men and woman are paid equally for equal work. The Court of Appeal 
agreed that Hextall’s claim should more appropriately be characterised as an equal terms 
claim rather than an indirect sex discrimination claim but, in any event, both claims would 
fail. The Court’s view was that this case turned on an argument that men were disadvantaged 
by the ‘whole statutory scheme, in turn derived from EU law, under which special treatment 
is given to birth mothers’.96  Even if Hextall could show that he was placed at a disadvantage, 
this could be justified as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, ‘namely the 
special treatment of mothers in connection with pregnancy or childbirth’.97 
Ali and Hextall have raised complex issues which ultimately turn on what we regard as the 
purpose of paid leave and how we value care. On one view, privileging the enhanced 
protection for mothers should not be diminished particularly when many pregnant women 
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and new mothers in the UK and in NZ continue to report negative workplace experiences.98 
Demanding equivalence of treatment between women on maternity leave and men on shared 
parental leave runs the risk that employers will ‘level down’ thereby reducing the amount 
paid to women, which would be a regressive step. Yet it is difficult to see how the gendered 
division of caring labour can be disrupted without giving fathers enhanced pay. This is 
especially the case when men are typically the higher earners in a relationship. Indeed, Rubery 
and Grimshaw have highlighted how intimately care is bound up with the gender pay gap.99 
Recognising that work is ‘a broader social activity, not purely an economic one’100 factors 
contributing to the pay gap have been found to: 
“…include the under-valuation of women’s work and norms reinforcing women’s 
position as economic dependents. Workplace characteristics and sex segregation of 
women into low value-added jobs…especially in sectors that lack union representation 
also play an important role.  Many of these factors can also be traced to the unequal 
division of unpaid labour in the home shaping patterns of segregation, working time 
schedules and access to promotion”. 101 
Families are therefore caught in a vicious circle where the father will typically earn more and 
so it makes better economic sense for mothers to take extended leave from work unless 
fathers are entitled to enhanced payments. The Court of Appeal, however, has refused to see 
the lack of enhanced payments as an issue of unlawful sex discrimination. Although the SPL 
Regulations offer the promise of shared care-giving between parents, they are proving ill-
equipped to unsettle the deep-seated and out-dated idealised norms in this area based on 
the caregiving mother and breadwinning father.  
 
Part 4: Reconciling paid work and care in the pursuit of substantive equality  
 
How do we reconcile paid work in the market and unpaid care in the home? The discussion 
of the NZ and UK case studies offers two contrasting examples of how legislators and policy-
makers have sought to protect carers. The UK model relies on traditional gender divisions and 
offers protection to mothers who may choose to transfer some entitlement to fathers; the 
NZ model breaks the link between childbirth and childcare but, in adopting a gender-
neutralised vision of care, leaves biological mothers with little protection.  
 
Issues around pregnancy, maternity and the care of young children highlights the enduring 
feminist paradox regarding the way to achieve greater equality between men and women.102 
Historically this debate was conceptualised around two opposing frameworks: equality-as-
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sameness and equality-as-difference.103 Ultimately, the choice of a framework leads to the 
question of whether law should be instrumental towards the search for equality or whether, 
on the contrary, it should recognise differences. Those who worked from an equality-as-
sameness position104 saw women as equally capable as men of participating in the labour 
market105 and concentrated their efforts on abolishing the barriers that prevented women’s 
full participation in that sphere. This argument lined up nicely with the dominant economic 
model, which is based on growth and the promotion of women into the paid workforce. The 
application of this doctrine to the issue of pregnancy and maternity has resulted in the 
adoption of provisions allowing women to take time off work in relation to pregnancy and 
maternity and anti-discrimination rules preventing the dismissal of pregnant workers and 
workers on maternity leave. If there is agreement on this general goal, the main debate within 
this school of thought has been on the best method for achieving gender equality by using 
formal and/or substantive equality.106  
 
Supporters of equality-as-difference put emphasis on the differences between men and 
women, especially when women are considered in their role as mothers and carers. Under 
this model, biological differences (such as the right to bear children) and socially constructed 
differences (such as the equation of women with care) are recognised in order to achieve 
equality in practice.107 The principle of equality, which is criticised as being based on male 
norms and encouraging women to assimilate into a socially-constructed man’s world, is 
therefore considered to undervalue actual (childbearing) or perceived/constructed 
(childrearing) unique female attributes. This is problematic when the majority of the caring 
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Navigating the dichotomy of paid work/unpaid care with its distinctly gendered divisions has 
led to policy outcomes predicated along similar binary lines. For this reason, more recent calls 
for reconciliation of the work/care dilemma have been made from a position of substantive 
equality.110 For Fredman, the solution lies in making a distinction between pregnancy and 
parenting (which the NZ legislation does) but adequately protecting both by ‘levelling up’ the 
rights for fathers and reforming the structure of working time.111 As Fredman argues, for 
women to be enabled to participate in the paid labour market on the same basis as men, 
fathers need encouragement to engage in the unpaid caring labour in the home otherwise 
claims for equality are made without due recognition of these unequal starting points. ‘The 
traditional understanding of equality as based on the formula that likes should be treated 
alike requires’, observes Fredman, ‘a prior understanding of when two individuals are 
appropriately alike. This pushes the discourse into a sameness–difference debate which is 
ultimately unproductive.’112 According to Fredman, substantive equality requires changing 
‘gender-based roles’ so that men and women participate equally at home and in paid 
labour.113 It is only through men’s equal participation in the home that women will be on an 
equal footing to participate in the market. For this to happen, the ‘social value of 
parenthood’114 needs to be respected, which would then incentivise men to participate in 
care work. To bring about this ‘levelling up’ of paternal rights to the same basis as those given 
to mothers would require mandating men to take care leave and ensuring that this 
adequately remunerated115 although as the discussion of Ali and Hextall above showed, the 
courts have been reluctant to do this. 
 
A model of substantive equality promotes changes in the socio-economic and historical 
structural inequalities through, in particular, the dismantlement of the public/private 
divide116 and the implementation of positive actions.117 Fredman’s important contribution to 
this debate joins with other scholars who have argued that a key part of dismantling the 
historic delineation between male and female norms in this area is to introduce measures 
aimed at correcting the unequal sharing of unpaid (domestic) work between men and 
women.118 Another way forward would be to separate entirely ideas of gender from care. 
Equating women with care leads to the exclusion of men from this area of life and denies men 
the opportunities to explore their nurturing identity. Ultimately, this also limits the ability to 
think further about the organisation of family life, the relationship between work and family, 
and the ability to break the public/private divide. In other words, linking care to women in 
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such an essential way limits our ability to change and challenge the organisation of society. 
‘Coding’ care in such gendered terms fails to address the relationship between the public and 
the private spheres which contributes to the invisibility of care as it is not considered to be 
‘work’.119 By contrast, if care is stripped of its feminisation through this gendered coding and 
treated as a universal and gender-neutral responsibility on all of us, paid employment might 
be restructured so that it becomes open to all of us to participate in while men would be 
better placed to engage in unpaid care at home. For this to happen we argue for a gender-
neutral concept of care to be given a more central place in policy-making. 
 
Part 5: A way forward: Placing care as a central tenet 
Substantive gender equality in the workplace cannot be achieved without a fairer 
redistribution of unpaid care and domestic work. As a result, a number of law and policy 
initiatives have endeavoured to involved men in care work. Such provisions include the 
gender neutralisation from pregnancy/maternity leave to parental leave, the individualisation 
of the right to parental leave and the limitation of the right to transfer the leave to a partner, 
as well as the increase of the right to paternity/partner leave.  The legislation in NZ on primary 
carer’s leave and the UK law on shared parental leave have been enacted in this context. As 
we have seen, in the UK model, care is primarily linked to women as the right to caring leave 
‘belongs’ initially to the mother whereas the NZ model aspires to render gender invisible but 
with the unintended consequence of depriving biological mothers of important health 
protections. At the heart of why both policy developments might be viewed with some 
unease is that they seem ill-equipped to lead to a genuine reconciliation of paid work and 
care.  
The work of Joan Williams may provide a helpful way through these dilemmas. Her work 
reflects her unease with the outdated and binary arguments between the 
sameness/difference feminists, which appears to inform policy-making in this area despite 
the feminist movement having long moved on from this dichotomy. The historic legacy of 
these debates – either calling for a strategy of assimilating women into male-dominated 
domains with the onus on women to conform120 or alternatively demanding that women’s 
differences be accommodated – have encouraged a view of gender-neutral societal 
institutions and workplaces despite the reality being that the paid labour market remains 
shaped around men’s typical life patterns.121 Williams’ theory of ‘reconstructive feminism’ is 
of particular relevance here. While she recognises the impact that an assimilationist strategy 
has had in bringing women into paid employment, she points out that ‘what is required to 
start a revolution is often different from what is required to complete it’.122 She is similarly 
sceptical about adopting fully the reform strategies of the difference feminism school with its 
alleged ‘conflation of women with conventional femininity’.123 This is not because she is 
dismissive of traditional feminised work such as care, rather she argues that care work is ‘too 
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important’ to be undervalued.124 Instead Williams offers a model of reconstructive feminism, 
which: 
“…defines equality as treating men and women the same but only after deconstructing 
the existing norms defined by and around men and masculinity, and reconstructing 
existing institutions in ways that include the bodies and traditional life patterns of 
women”.125 
This would require, she argues, that we ‘bump the debate up one logical level’ from the 
enduring dilemma that seems so present in the underlying strategic work of policy -makers: 
“arguing that the gender trouble that creates work-family conflict stems not from 
women (from their likeness to men or their difference from men) but from masculine 
workplace norms that offer women only two unequal paths”.126 
For example, the default workplace norm in many institutions of progression being 
dependent on long and unpredictable hours is clearly detrimental to those with caring 
responsibilities. Leaving that structure in place but implementing a statutory right for 
employees to request flexible hours may address the issue but risks highlighting a perceived 
negative trait associated with those with caring responsibilities: a lack of flexibility. Williams’ 
response to this is to argue that such a proposal ‘…merely changes the shape of the gender 
bias, making women vulnerable by failing to pinpoint that the gender problem is with the 
masculine norm not in women themselves’.127 If legislators and policy-makers were to take as 
a point of departure the centrality of care to our productive lives, workplaces might be shaped 
in ways that are radically different to the current norm. Indeed, there is an increasing 
awareness that ‘without the contribution of unpaid care, markets would not grow, economies 
would not prosper and capitalism would not be possible.’128 Feminist scholars that have 
argued that what happens in the private sphere, far from being akin to a “leisure activity”, 
supports, and is the precondition of, what takes place in the public sphere.129 
As our earlier discussion showed, the law continues to grapple with the question of the 
purpose of caring leave and how best to protect care-givers. This has led to a somewhat messy 
and confused patchwork of employment protections for care-givers. These developments 
‘could be read as an equality move, albeit based on something akin to a formal equality 
model: if anyone can make a request for care leave, then the gendering of unpaid care is 
apparently challenged’ yet as Grabham continues, ‘this shift is just as much to do with private 
law and the logic of labour market equilibrium as it is to do with shifts in conjugal work and 
care models.’130 Grabham’s point that the right to request a pattern of care-giving that fits 
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around a particular set of familial circumstances is an important one because she shows how 
it is underpinned by the logic of the market. Parents are construed as ‘rational market actors’ 
who are free to bargain terms and conditions to suit them as part of a larger project of 
‘economic growth’.131 It is this fundamental assumption that those engaged in the paid labour 
of the market are autonomous legal subjects capable of exercising free choice that arguably 
lies at the root of the theoretical incoherence of these latest care-giving policy initiatives. Put 
simply, both the law and the market assume actors devoid of caring roles when the reality is 
that we are all relational beings with each of us being involved, to varying degrees, in caring 
and being cared for.  
If we take that as our starting point, it is clear that we need to re-think fundamentally how 
the paid labour market is structured and the assumptions upon which it is based. As Herring 
has argued, ‘the law for too long has been arranged around the vision of an able, autonomous 
and unattached adult’.132 The law’s assumption of autonomy has led to caring being viewed 
as an ‘ancillary’ activity rather than ‘central to our humanity’.133 Herring calls for a ‘different 
vision: one which starts with recognising that our identities, values and well-being are tied up 
with our relationships and the responsibilities that come with them’.134 One way of achieving 
this is to redesign work life around care. For Fraser this would involve taking women’s – rather 
than men’s life patterns – as the default norm: 
“Women today often combine breadwinning and caregiving, albeit with great 
difficulty and strain. A postindustrial welfare state must ensure that men do the same, 
while redesigning institutions so as to eliminate the difficulty and strain”.135 
For Fineman, her vulnerability paradigm suggests that vulnerability is something that is 
inherently part of what it is to be human and is both universal and constant.136 Our natural 
and inherent dependency on each other requires ‘collective or public responsibility’ with care 
labour being ‘treated as equally productive even if unwaged, and should be measured by its 
societal value, not by economic or market indicators’.137   
Conclusion 
As societal conceptions of care shift, policy-makers have responded by providing more 
expansive protections for care-givers. This paper considered two common law jurisdictions: 
New Zealand and the UK. In recent years both states have grappled with the reconciliation of 
care and paid work yet both have taken different policy directions. In NZ, the state has 
differentiated care from childbirth. Adopting a more expansive notion of care-giving, leave is 
given to the primary caregiver. By focussing on the act of care rather than the identity of the 
person who has borne the child, the NZ legislation appears to be ‘gender neutral’. This offers 
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considerable scope to move towards a universal care-giver model, which is removed from 
historical and problematic identities of ideal mothers and fathers. Yet as the NZ experience 
has shown, taking gender neutralisation too far has had unfortunate unintended 
consequences for biological mothers, whose health and safety protections following the birth 
are now minimal. 
The UK has similarly sought to untangle the role of caring from the biological act of childbirth. 
Its model of ‘shared parenting’ has the aim of allowing families to shape their own patterns 
of care but is premised on the implicit assumption that caring will largely rest with the mother. 
The entitlement to leave belongs initially to the mother who may choose to transfer this to 
the father. Unlike the NZ model, the UK preserves a closer association between childbirth and 
childcare to the protection of the biological mother but fails to unsettle the gendered 
separation of domestic and market life.  
Both case studies have revealed the difficulties associated with untangling care from 
gendered concepts of parenting, particularly when the wider economic terrain relies on these 
gendered divisions at home for its survival. The market relies on the unpaid reproductive 
labour in the domestic sphere so that workers engaged in paid labour can perform as though 
they are free of caring responsibilities. Moreover, central to both the NZ and UK models is the 
notion of choice: mothers can choose whether to retain the primary caregiving responsibility 
as the law assumes or they can decide to transfer that role to another. Yet for all its 
appearance of being a progressive shift in policy, this turn towards further embedding choice 
is problematic. This is not merely because of the implicit assumptions made that caregiving 
will typically be a role performed by a woman who can choose to hand this to another but 
because it further embeds the idea that law’s subjects are autonomous, capable of bargaining 
freely, and devoid of any caring role. Reproductive labour therefore falls outside of the 
protection of employment law. As Conaghan has remarked ‘persistent calls by feminist legal 
scholars…to redraw the boundaries of labour law to take proper account of unpaid caregiving 
work appear for the most part to have fallen on deaf ears.’138 
If legislators are serious about achieving sincerely progressive change in recognising the value 
of caring, it is clear that we need to re-think the very assumptions upon which our policies of 
care-giving protections are based. The theoretical incoherence behind initiatives reconciling 
care and paid labour are arguably a left-over from earlier feminist strategies, which have 
oscillated between assimilating women into the paid world of work or recognising biological 
and/or socially constructed differences. While it is now clear that substantive equality 
requires a more deep-seated structural reform and that the richness of feminist thought 
offers huge potential to shape our care policies, gendered identities have proven hard to shift 
particularly when it has come to policy formulation in the area of care leave. By focusing 
instead on the vulnerability of law’s subjects (in stark contrast to its assumption of autonomy) 
and our universal caring responsibilities, we are provided with a radically altered starting 
point for future work. Rather than continuing to develop initiatives that appear blind to the 
fundamental and universal work of caring or which aim for gender neutrality but at the 
detriment of the biological-maternal health, we need to question the assumptions that 
underpin our policy goals. We might begin this task by asking how our institutions could look 
if we started from an assumption of universal caring. 
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